TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Beyond the First Amendment

- Spheres of Discourse (Video)
- Cases and Articles ("Cursing at Toilet Not Illegal" Article)
- U.S. Knowledge (Citizenship Quiz)


Flag Burning

- History of the Issue (History)
- Moral Panic (Overview & Links, Video: Moral Panic! at the Disco)
- Legal Brief of Landmark Case (Texas v. Johnson 1989)
- Authoritarian Aesthetic
- Nativism and Flag Burning (Overview with Links)
- Academic Freedom (How Free Should We Be?)
- Flag in Pop Culture (Video)
- Question on the Quad (Poll and Video)


Campus Hate Speech

- Initial Arguments (Initial Arguments)
- Campus Speech Codes (Is There A Solution?)
- Scenarios (Quiz)
- Landmark Cases Briefed (Doe v. Michigan 1989, UWM Post v. The Regents of the University of Wisconsin 1991, Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University 1991, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 1992, Dambrot v. Central Michigan University 1993, Robert Corry, et al. v. Leland Stanford Junior University 1995)
- Open Debate on College Campuses (Bradley Smith on Phil Donahue)


Holocaust Denial

- Arthur Butz (Scholarly Holocaust Denier?)
- Denying the Holocaust (Campus and Education)
- Holocaust Museum (About the Museum)
- Landmark Case Briefed (Mel Mermelstein v. the Institute of Historical Review 1985)
- Holocaust Deniers (Links)

CASE BRIEF: Robert Corry, et al. v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1995)

Robert Corry, et al. v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1995)

Title and citation

Robert Corry, et al. v. Leland Stanford Junior University,
Case No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995)


Facts

The issue began in an African American-themed dorm, where several students got into an argument about the race of Ludwig van Beethoven. A group of drunk white students drew Beethoven in a black caricature and posted it near the room of a black student who claimed Beethoven was mulatto; later, a black-fraternity poster was vandalized, with the word “niggers” being scrawled across it. The student who defaced the poster was not sanctioned, but simply moved to a different dorm. In response to the overarching issue, the University adopted a policy for racial harassment disciplinary action in 1990. Though no one was ever punished under the policy, four years later the University was sued by four students who challenged the policy, saying that is lowered the quality of education by not allowing the discussion of important issues.


Issues

1. Does the policy violate the First Amendment?


Held

1. Yes; the policy does violate the First Amendment based on the decisions in the earlier cases.


Reasoning

The court ruled that the policy did in fact violate the First Amendment, based on the rulings in earlier cases, and determined the policy as overbroad and content-biased.


Decision

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Robert Corry et. al.


Significance

This case upheld the precedents set in the prior cases.

CASE BRIEF: Dambrot v. Central Michigan University

Dambrot v. Central Michigan University

Title and citation

Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 1995 FED App. 0168P (6th Cir.)


Facts

The issue was basketball coach Keith Dambrot repeatedly using the word “nigger” as a “motivational tool” during private team practices. Once it became known by officials that Dambrot used the term, he was investigated, coinciding with the filing of a complaint by a former player, and Dambrot was informed that his use of the word violated the University’s anti-harassment policy. As punishment, he accepted five days without pay. Once bad publicity had built up from the community in regard to the issue, the athletic director told Dambrot that his contract would not be renewed. Dambrot filed suit against the University, claiming that his rights to free speech, academic freedom, and due process had been violated.


Issues

1. Does Dambrot's use of the word "nigger" constitute harassment within the university's policy?


Held

1. No; the policy does not specifically identify an offensive environment.


Reasoning

The court found that the University’s policy was overbroad and void for vagueness because it does not specifically identify an offensive environment.


Decision

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Keith Dambrot.


Significance

This case discusses the need for specificity in campus speech policies and again cites the void-for-vagueness issue when analyzing the speech code.

CASE BRIEF: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 1992

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 1992

Title and citation

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377


Facts

In 1990 the city of St. Paul, MN adopted a hate speech ordinance that prohibited placing graffiti or other forms of offensive items such as a burning cross or swastika, which would likely incite anger or create a hostile environment, on public or private property. A minor, Robert Viktora, was charged with violating the ordinance by participating in a cross-burning on the property of an African American family. Viktora did not argue with the facts of the case but challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional because it censored expressive conduct.


Issues

1. Does the ordinance censor expressive conduct?


Held

1. Yes; the code was overbroad and censored selectively, and content-based speech codes are not constitutional.


Reasoning

The Supreme Court decided that the ordinance was overbroad and based on content (it only included specific, racial and religious fighting words and not others, such as political affiliation and did not ban fighting words against bigots, only by them).


Decision

Though lower courts dismissed the case and ruled that the city ordinance was not overbroad, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Robert Viktora (R.A.V.).


Significance

This case set the precedent against content-based speech codes.

CASE BRIEF: Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University (1991)

Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity

v. George Mason University (1991)

Title and citation

Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University (1991),
773 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d 993 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993)


Facts

Student leaders implored the dean to sanction Sigma Chi after a student wore blackface and a black wig with curlers, as well as pillow stuffing in the breast and buttocks area, during a spirit week. The student leaders said the display was offensive and promoted racial and sexist stereotypes. The dean prohibited Sigma Chi from holding sports and social events for two years and, during that probationary period, required them to get approval from the university to hold other planned activities. In response, Sigma Chi sued the University, claiming that their free speech rights were being violated by this sanction.


Issues

1. Can a university sanction language for being offensive?


Held

1. No; it is not lawful to punish speech simply because it may be offensive to some people.

Reasoning

The court held that the students' speech or the use of blackface cannot be banned simply because some people find it offensive, especially since GMU did not even have a hate speech code to base their decision on.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity.

Significance

This case, with the two preceding cases in 1989 and 1991, set a precedent for universities, that in order to regulate hate speech a code cannot punish protected speech, must be very clear about what is prohibited or punishable, and cannot base punishment on content of speech.

CASE BRIEF: UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin (1991)

UWM Post v.

Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin (1991)

Title and citation

UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin,
774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991)


Facts

This case involved a hate speech code that was intentionally reworked and clarified following the University of Michigan decision - it was clear and narrow, explicitly stating the behaviors and speech that were off-limits as part of the code. Still, a suit was filed against the University within a year of the policy’s inception, by the student newspaper. The newspaper, the UWM Post, argued that the policy was overbroad and vague, which violated their free expression rights. The University rebutted that the policy fell under the umbrella of fighting words, and that the court could narrow it if it was found to be overbroad.


Issues

1. Is the code overbroad or vague?


Held

1. Yes; the code does not fall under the fighting words umbrella, and does not specify whether intent is required in the instance of fighting words.


Reasoning

The court determined that the code was overbroad and vague, and did not fit the requirements of the fighting words doctrine (fighting words being speech that will likely lead to a breach in the peace, not just speech that harms) - the code was also vague because it didn’t clarify whether intent to create a breach of peace would count as fighting words, or if a hostile environment must actual be created by the speech to count as fighting words.


Decision

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the UWM Post.


Significance

Even though the aforementioned code was revamped after the Michigan decision, it was still too broad and too vague to be constitutionally protected. This demonstrates just how specific and definitive these codes must be in order to hold up to court scrutiny.

CASE BRIEF: DOE v. MICHIGAN

CASE BRIEF: DOE v. MICHIGAN (1989)


Title and citation

Doe v. Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich 1989)


Facts

In 1989, the plaintiff Doe filed suit against the University of Michigan, claiming that their year-old hate speech code was unconstitutional because it violated free speech rights of students. As a teaching assistant who talked about potentially sensitive subjects he wanted to have the speech code dismantled before he could be charged with violating it.

Issues

1. Is a campus speech code constitutional?

2. Can a university regulate obscenity?


Held

1. Yes; the university can have policies to protect against harassment, discrimination, threats, and assault as long as they are specific and do not extend to censoring speech based on opinion or arbitrary reasoning.

2. Yes; as long as the university specifically defines "obscenity" and offers specific parameters, giving the faculty and staff fair warning of what is punishable under the policy.


Reasoning

The court stated that the code was overbroad and vague, so that officials could pick and choose which speech to prosecute and sanction those who used speech they did not like. The judge recognized the University’s right to have policies on discrimination, harassment, threats, and assault but that that did not extend to censoring speech that the University simply did not agree with or that did not fit into their desired message or found it offensive. The court found that the University must also give fair warning as to what is prohibited under the policy and what is protected. The University cannot regulate “obscenity” without going on to define what qualifies as “obscene” within the policy. If the policy does not offer parameters, then the students and faculty cannot be expected to abide by it because they have no way of understanding which behaviors and speech are prohibited and therefore punishable.


Decision

The court ruled in favor of Doe.


Significance

The ruling in this case sets a precedent for requirements of speech codes on campuses, maintaining that all provisions must be specifically outined and defined and that students and faculty must be given fair warning of what is considered punishable.

Campus Hate Speech Incidents

Yale University (graffiti)

UC Irvine (Nazi imagery)

Pomona College (hate crime)

Brown University (student expelled)

University of Mississippi (slashing incident)

Columbia University (noose incident)

FirstAmendmentCenter.org

FirstAmendmentCenter.org offers a page of resources regarding free speech on public college campuses.